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AVOIDING SPECIAL USE VALUATION RECAPTURE
 — by Neil E. Harl*
Although relatively less use has been made of special use
valuation of land in recent years, the heavier use of the valua-
tion option in the late 1970s and early 1980s can still lead to
recapture.1  For deaths before 1982, the potential recapture
period is 15 years after the death of the decedent;2 full recap-
ture occurs within the first ten years with a phaseout between
10 and 15 years.3  For deaths after 1981, the recapture period
has been reduced to 10 years after the decedent's death (or 10-
years after the commencement of "qualified use" under the two
year grace period).4  
The key question is what events can lead to recapture.
Transfer outside the family .  During the recapture
period, with a few exceptions, only transfers to a member of
the qualified heir's family avoid recapture.5  It is important to
note that it is transfers to a member of the qualified heir's
family that avoid recapture, not transfers to a member of the
decedent's family.
The term "member of the family" is defined in terms of a
base person:  the decedent-to-be in the pre-death period, for
purposes of special use valuation eligibility, and the qualified
heir in the period the property is held by the qualified heir.6
•  For deaths before 1982, the term "member of the fam-
ily" encompasses an individual's ancestors or lineal descen-
dants, lineal descendants of grandparents, the individual's
spouse and the spouse of any such descendant.7
•  For deaths after 1981, the definition of "member of fam-
ily" was narrowed to include only the ancestors of the individ-
ual, the person's spouse, lineal descendants of the individual,
lineal descendants of the individual's spouse, lineal descendant
of the parents of the individual (not of the grandparents, as
under pre-1982 law)8 and the spouse of any lineal
descendants.9  The spouse of a lineal descendant remains a
family member even though the descendant dies.10  But
remarriage terminates the prior marriage relationship for
purposes of special use valuation.11
Example (1):   Grandmother died in 1985 leaving three
living children and two grandchildren born of a child that
predeceased Grandmother.  One of the living children, Charlie,
farms the old home place.  Can the grandchildren (of the
predeceased child) sell their interests in the land to their Uncle
Charlie without triggering special use valuation recapture?
The answer is no.  Their Uncle Charlie is not a member of
their family.  He's not a lineal descendant of the parents of the
"base persons" — the grandchildren as qualified heirs.
*
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Example (2):   Had the death in Example 1 occurred in
1980, could special use valuation recapture be avoided on
transfer to Uncle Charlie?  The answer is yes.  For deaths
before 1982, "member of family" includes the lineal descen-
dants of the grandparents of the base person.
Example (3):   Regardless of the date of death, could
Uncle Charlie sell his interest in the land to the grandchildren
(his nieces and nephews)?  The answer is yes?  The grandchil-
dren are lineal descendants of both the parents and grandparents
of Charlie.
Exchanges.  For exchanges after 1981, recapture does
not occur if qualified real property is exchanged in a tax-free
exchange for "qualified exchange property."12  Qualified
exchange property is real property used for the same qualified
use as the property transferred.13
If both qualified exchange property and other property are
received, the recapture tax is reduced by an amount bearing the
same ratio to the recapture tax as the fair market value of the
qualified exchange property bears to the fair market value of
the property exchanged.14
Recapture does not occur if qualified real property is
involuntarily converted and "qualified replacement property" is
acquired.15  Qualified replacement property is real property
used for the same qualified use as the property involuntarily
converted.16
Handling indebtedness.  There is no authority on
whether placing a mortgage or other credit obligation on the
property would constitute a disposition for special use valua-
tion purposes.  It would seem that if the funds obtained
remain invested in the business in farm real or personal
property, there should be no recapture but authority is lacking
on that point.
In a 1989 ruling,17 specially valued property was sold to
non qualified heirs to pay off outstanding debt on other
specially valued property, both under threat of foreclosure, and
special use valuation benefits were recaptured.
The transfer of property to the bankruptcy estate (where an
individual files Chapter 7 or 11 bankruptcy) is apparently not
a taxable disposition and does not cause recapture under special
use valuation rules.18  If the special use valuation property is
transferred by the bankruptcy estate to a member of the
debtor's family, no recapture should occur.  In the event the
special use property is transferred by the bankruptcy estate to
someone who is not a member of the debtor's family and
special use valuation benefits are recaptured, the responsibility
of payment of the additional tax should be the responsibility
of the bankruptcy estate  as an administrative expense of the
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estate.19  The recapture obligation is secured by a lien to
assure payment of the tax.20  Any special use valuation recap-
ture tax remaining unpaid would be an unsecured claim and if
the bankruptcy estate does not have sufficient property to pay
the remaining tax, the question is whether the debtor's obliga-
tion to pay the recapture tax is dischargeable.  There is no
authority on that point but it would seem to depend upon
whether the debtor's obligation is characterized as contingent
liability, which is ordinarily dischargeable, or a tax which is
not if the tax arose within three years of filing bankruptcy.21
Qualified use test .  Failure of each qualified heir to
meet the "qualified use" test causes recapture of special use
valuation benefits.22  In general, the qualified use test requires
that each qualified heir have an equity interest in the farm or
ranch operation.23  With two exceptions, cash rent leases
result in recapture of benefits.24  A 1981 amendment created a
two-year grace period after the decedent's death for meeting the
qualified use test retroactive to January 1, 1977.25  A 1988
amendment, retroactive to 1977, permits a surviving spouse
who inherits qualified real property to lease the land on a "net
cash basis" to a member of the spouse's family without
causing recapture.26  For cash rent leases by trusts, the surviv-
ing spouse must be the only beneficiary if the exception is to
apply.27  A crop share or livestock share lease, even on a non
material participation basis, is a sufficient equity interest to
avoid recapture.28  Even a hybrid cash rent lease has met the
test in which the landowner was entitled to receive the lesser
of the actual production from the land or 40 bushels of corn
and 13 bushels of soybeans as rent per acre.29
Although the authority is relatively weak, it appears that
participation in government acreage diversion programs by a
qualified heir does not lead to recapture of federal estate tax
benefits.30  Participation in the federal 10-year Conservation
Reserve Program does not result in recapture.31  And IRS has
ruled that the transfer of land to the Minnesota Land Conser-
vation program (similar to the federal CRP program) does not
cause recapture of special use valuation benefits.32
Material participation test .  Absence of material
participation for more than three years in any eight year period
ending after the decedent's death triggers recapture.33  Material
participation may be by the qualified heir or any member of
the qualified heirs family, for the period during which the
property was held by the qualified heir, and by the decedent or
member of the decedent's family during the time the property
was held by the decedent.34
For a qualified heir who is the surviving spouse of the
decedent, a person who has not reached age 21, disabled
individual or full-time student, the material participation test
may be met by "active management" by the qualified heir (or
by a fiduciary if the qualified heir is a person under age 21 or a
disabled individual).35  Active management means the making
of management decisions of a business (other than daily
operating decisions).36  This provision is effective for deaths
after 1981.37
As with the qualified use test, participation in government
acreage diversion programs by a qualified heir does not appear
to lead to recapture of federal estate tax benefits because of
absence of material participation.38
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
BANKS
FRAUD .  The defendant bank had agreed to allow the
plaintiff debtor to receive immediate credit on third party
checks, effectively allowing the plaintiff to "kite" checks and
obtain unsecured loans during the check float periods.  When
the amount of such loans exceeded legal limits, the bank pro-
posed that the debtor transfer farm land to the bank by quit-
claim deed but assured the debtor that the deed would not
change the actual ownership of the land.  The deed allowed the
bank to write off the plaintiff's loans.  The scheme was
supported by having the plaintiffs "rent" the land from the
bank.  The court set aside the deed because the deed transfer
was induced by the bank's fraud.  The court upheld the trial
court's apportionment of damages and various setoffs based on
the equities and misconduct of all parties.  National Bank
& Trust Co. v. Campbell, 463 N.W.2d 104 (Iowa
Ct. App. 1990).
GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING.  The defen-
dant bank had agreed to lend the plaintiff $50,000 in two equal
installments subject to the plaintiffs providing additional
collateral.  The defendant rescinded the agreement when it
learned that the plaintiff had subsequently signed contracts to
purchase additional equipment financed by loans from another
bank.  The court held that the rescission was not a breach of
the duty of good faith and fair dealing because the decision was
based on reasonable business standard of requiring debtors to
fully disclose their financial condition.  Mann Farms v .
Traders State Bank of Poplar, 801 P.2d 73 (Mont.
1990) .
BANKRUPTCY
  GENERAL  
AUTOMATIC STAY .  The debtor claimed an exemp-
tion in a homestead which had been recovered by the deed of
trust holder in a foreclosure.  No objection was filed as to the
exemption.  The debtor's nondebtor spouse filed a state court
action against the creditor for fraudulent transfer of the home-
stead interest but the action was removed to the Bankruptcy
Court which dismissed the action for violating the automatic
stay.  The appellate court held that although the exemption
was not objected to, the exemption was not allowed because
the homestead did not exist at the time of the bankruptcy
filing.  In addition, the debtor did not have any right to avoid
the transfer as fraudulent until the trustee failed to file such an
action.  Matter of Sherk, 918 F.2d 1170 (5th Cir .
1990) .
DISCHARGE.  The debtors operated a construction
company which obtained title insurance from the creditor.  As
was the common practice in the industry, affidavits of
completed construction were completed, signed and notarized
on the date the construction loan was originally closed, with
the date of completion left blank.  The debtors falsely used
these affidavits to represent that payments had been made to
subcontractors and the construction was completed.  The credi-
tor insurance company argued that the resulting loss was
nondischargeable under Section 523(a)(2)(A) for misrepresenta-
tion.  The court held that because the affidavits were completed
at the time the loan was made, the affidavits were not untrue
when made and no intent to deceive was present when the affi-
davits were made.  The court noted that the use of this proce-
dure of completing all paper work at the beginning may have
been convenient for the parties but the procedure undermined
the integrity of affidavits and under bankruptcy law relieved the
debtor of any misrepresentation from improper use of the affi-
davits.  In re  Pitt, 121 B.R. 493 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
1990) .
ESTATE PROPERTY.  A creditor manufactured herbi-
cides sold through a distributor to the debtor.  The herbicide
was shipped to the debtor with an agreement that the purchase
by the debtor was not complete until the debtor broke the seals
on the storage tanks.  In addition, the bills of lading identified
the seller and buyer as the manufacturing company.  The credi-
